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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-INFANTS-ESTOPPEL BY FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.-In Stern-
lieb v. Normandie National Securities Corporation, 188 N. E. 726, we have a
decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, rendered January 9, 1934, in which
the court discusses the pros and cons as to the advisability of permitting infants
to disaffirm their contracts, whether they be made for necessaries or not. Here one
Irving Sternlieb, an infant is attempting to recover from the defendant corpora-
tion, the purchase price of five shares of stock, purchased by the infant plaintiff
on September 21, 1929, paying $990 for the aforesaid stock. The stock depreciated
in value until it became practically worthless and on September 14, 1932, the
plaintiff notified the defendant that he had rescinded his contract and demanded a
return of the purchase price paid, stating that he was ready and willing to tender
back the worthless stock. The defendant, in its answer, as a defense, set up the
fraudulent representations of the infant that at the time of the purchase he was
over 21 years of age and that the defendant, relying on these statements, parted
with the stock. The plaintiff moved to strike out this defense, which motion was
denied by the Municipal Court. This decision was reversed by the Appellate Divi-
sion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division, hold-
ing that this defense was insufficient in law.
The common law rule of New York and the majority of other states is that
an infant has not the capacity to bind himself absolutely by his contracts since
any contract made by him during his infancy may be avoided. See International
Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722 (1912); Beardsley v.
Hotchkiss, 96 N. Y. 201 (1884). But the general rule is that he is liable for
necessaries purchased. See Smoot v. Ryan, 65 So. 828 (Ala. 1914); Midland Valley
R. Co. v. Johnson, 215 S. W. 665 (Ark. 1919); Stanhope v. Shambow, 170 Pac.
752 (Mont. 1918). Law as to the validity of infants' contracts can be found as
far back as the year 1200, in which the court permits an infant to disaffirm his
contract upon reaching the age of 21. See Y. B. 20 and 21 Edw. I, p. 318; and
by the fifteenth century it was generally well settled that an infant's bargain was
void at his election and also that he was liable for necessaries. See Y. B. 18 Edw.
IV, p. 17, and 10 Hen. VI, pl. 46.
For centuries the age of 21 has been fixed by the law at which both man and
woman has been regarded as being of full capacity, and generally no distinction
has been drawn between a minor of tender years, and one having nearly attained
his majority. But see Hakes Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 166 Cal. 557, 137 Pac. 911 (1913),
and Casement v. Callaghan, 35 N. D. 27, 159 N. W. 77 (1916), which, by statute,
held that a minor above the age of 18 cannot disaffirm a contract without restoring
the consideration. By statutes, in many states, a woman becomes of age at 18:
Colorado, Dakota, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. In a few states
marriage by either man or woman under the age of 21 gives them full contractual
capacity: Iowa, Louisiana, and Washington. See Ex parte Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41,
100 Pac. 159, 21 L. R. A. 847, 132 Am. St. Rep. 592 (1909).
All these early cases show that both the common law and statute favored the
infant in his contractual capacity and guarded him against the fraud and deceit
of his fellow adults. Now, what we really want to determine is just how far
these laws favoring the infant, have gone. It is conceivable that if the law will
go to the extreme in protecting the infant in his contracts that such a law will
be taken advantage of by more mature infants and as a result innocent persons
will suffer thereby.
When an infant who has nearly reached the age of maturity, induces another,
by fraudulent representations, to enter into a contract with him, the infant should
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be made to incur some risk so as to discourage future attempts by infants to
avoid their contracts at the expense of another. It is a general rule that the
infant's right to plead the defense of infancy is not lost to him by estoppel based
on his false assertions as to his age. See Wieland v. Kobick, 110 Ill. 16, 51 Am.
Rep. 676 (1884); Ridgeway v. Herbert, 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W. 1040, 73 Am. St.
Rep. 464 (1899) ; Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79, 31 Am. Rep. 678 (1878). But see
Ingram v. Ison, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 48, 80 S. W. 787 (1904), holding "that one who,
at the time of the execution of a deed was lacking not more than a month of
21 years of age, and represented that he was over 21 and bore that appearance,
being a married man, the father of two children, and wearing a full beard, was
estopped to maintain a suit in equity to set the deed aside on the ground of his
infancy at the time of execution." Also, it was held in Ostrander v. Quin, 84
Miss. 230, 105 Am. St. Rep. 426, 36 So. 256 (1904), "that wilful misrepresentation
of a mature woman over 18 years of age, that she was 21 at time she borrowed
money on a mortgage was a bar to a suit in equity by her to avoid the mortgage
on the ground of her minority at the time of execution."
Most of the jurisdictions require that the infant, before he can disaffirm his
contract by the defense of infancy, must first tender back that consideration which
he has received, if any remains in his possession. See Manning v. Johnson, 26
Ala. 446, 62 Am. Dec. 732 (1855); American Freehold Land Mtg. Co. v. Dykes, 111
Ala. 178, 18 So. 292, 56 Am. St. Rep. 38 (1895). But see Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H.
280, 59 Am. Dec. 345 (1853), which laid down the doctrine "that the infant
shall not be permitted to rescind his contract, and recover the articles parted with
by him, without first restoring the property or consideration received therefor." See
also Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N. H. 354, 47 Am. Rep. 209; 55 Tex. 281 (1879). (This
and other Texas cases to the same effect have been overruled by Bollock v. Sprowls,
93 Tex. 188, 54 S. W. 661, 77 Am. St. Rep. 849, 47 L. R. A. 326 (1889)).
The contracts of an infant relating to personal property can be avoided upon
his reaching majority, or during his minority. See Bell v. Burkhalter, 176 Ala.
62, 57 So. 460 (1912); Wuller v. Chuse Groc. Co., 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796, 132
Am. St. Rep. 216, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 128 (1909). It is well settled, and the
decisions are numerous, that an infant's conveyance of realty can be avoided only
after he has attained his majority. We cite only a few of the numerous decisions:
Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794 (1603); McCarthy v. Nicrosi, 72 Ala. 332, 47 Am.
Rep. 418 (1882) ; Harrod v. Myers, 21 Ark. 592, 76 Am. Dec. 409 (1860) ; Hastings
v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195 (1864). These rules have been held to apply generally
to all contracts whether executory or executed, although some statutes regulate
the time within which an infant's contract can be disaffirmed. See Luce v. Jestrob,
12 N. D. 548, 97 N. W. 848 (1903), where by statute the contract of a minor
cannot be disaffirmed after the expiration of one year from his majority. In some
jurisdictions the contract may be repudiated after the infant becomes of age,
within the Statute of Limitations. Wright v. Buchanan, 287 Ill. 468, 123 N. E. 53
(1919). While in other jurisdictions it is held that the right to avoid the contract
is not lost by mere inertness or silence continued for a period less than the Statute
of Limitations. Putnam v. Walker, 61 Fla. 720, 55 So. 844, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33
(1911).
As we survey these well established principles of both the common law, and
where re-enacted by statute, it can be clearly seen that the law protects the infant
very well. But what about innocent persons who deal with these infants? Are they
the ones who are to be made to suffer injustices as perpetrated by those infants
whose maturity has far exceeded their age? At this point we have extremely
desirable cases which present the equitable side of the issue.
In Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838), the court allowed the maintenance of
an action for the fraudulent misrepresentations that the defendant was of age
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saying: "This fraudulent representation was intended to induce, and did induce
the plaintiff to make a contract for the sale of the hats, but by no means makes
it part and parcel of the contract. It was antecedent to the contract and if an
infant is liable for a positive wrong connected with a contract, but arising after
the contract is made, he may' well be answerable for one committed before the
contract was entered into, although it might have led to the contract." The reason
given was: "If in procuring it, he may well, at law, be answerable for the previous
deceit through which it was procured, if he has thereby obtained the property of
another and refuses performance on his part." (Recovery must be for the actual
loss, and not according to the terms of the contract.)
In the second case, Commander v. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668 (1906), where a minor
succeeded in getting an adult to purchase land from him on the fraudulent mis-
representation that he was able to convey without the right to disaffirm, the court
said: "Minority is given for the protection of a person under age, but it cannot
be used as a weapon with which to commit a fraud. When a minor has reached
the stage of maturity in years and physical appearance calculated to deceive a
person of ordinary prudence and the minor does deceive such person as to his
age and asserts that he is of full age, and induces a contract to be made with him,
and accepts the benefits of his contract he will not be heard at any future time
to deny that he was of full age at the time the contract was executed." Here we
find in this case that the law puts much stress on the mature physical appearance
of the infant, and justly so. When the person so appears as he did in this case,
why should he be protected, at the expense of the other? I can immediately see
where objection would arise by those who contend that the law would be forced
to set some age at which an infant's contracts are voidable. Clearly so, but why
not allow equity jurisdiction to step in, and decide these cases at their own dis-
cretion and thereby aid innocent parties and deter the mature infant who makes
contracts which he does not intend to keep?
In the third case we have Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472 (1886), where an infant
disaffirms a contract for the purchase of chattels (not necessaries), and where the
adult seller then brought an action ex delicto, the court stated: "Our judgment,
however, is that where the infant does fraudulently and falsely represent that he
is of full age, he is liable in an action ex delicto for the injury resulting from his
tort. This result does not involve a violation of the principle that an infant is
not liable where the consequence would be an indirect enforcement of his contract,
for the recovery is not upon the contract, as that is treated as of no effect; nor
is he made to pay the contract price of the article purchased by him, as he is only
held to answer for the actual loss caused by the fraud. In holding him responsible
for the consequences of his wrong, an equitable conclusion is reached and one
which strictly harmonizes with the great doctrine that the infant is liable for his
torts." Going further, the court says: "We are unwilling to sanction any rule
which will enable an infant who has obtained the property of another by falsely
and fraudulently representing himself to be of full age, to enjoy the fruits of his
fraud, either by keeping the property himself or selling it to another and when
asked to pay its just and reasonable value successfully pleads his infancy." Mr.
Pomeroy pushes this doctrine farther by saying: "If an infant procures an agree-
ment to be made through false and fraudulent representations that he is of age,
a court of equity will enforce his liability as though he were an adult and may
cancel a conveyance or executed contract obtained by fraud." 2 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence (4th ed.) § 945.
As shown by these three aforesaid cases, we have a tendency to get away from
the majority holding at law, and shift the cases into equity. To hold, as these
cases do, would not be to deprive the infant of that protection which the law
seduously seeks to afford them in their dealings but would put them on an equal
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level with the adult and prevent the more mature from making unfair agreements.
For a recent decision which is contra, see Summit Auto Co. v. Jenkins, 153 N. E.
153 (Ohio 1925), where the court held that a minor was not estopped from setting
up the defense of infancy in avoidance of his contract (he had fraudulently mis-
represented his age), but could recover the amount paid by him without diminu-
tion for use of the automobile or for damages for depreciation.
The principal cases which hold that there is an estoppel are: Damron v. Com-
monwealth, 110 Ky. 268 (1901), and Sackett v. Asher, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 453
(Ky. 1909).
As we have seen from the above stated authorities, the decisions are numerable,
and the rule very general, that an infant may avoid his contracts. But what about
these contracts being contrary to public policy? Like so many questions of public
policy there is much to be said on both sides and the necessities of one period of
time are not always those of another. The law, from time out of mind, has recog-
nized that infants must be protected from their own folly and improvidence. It is
not always flattering to our young men in college and in business, between the
ages of 18 and 21, to refer to them as infants, and yet this is exactly what the
law considers them in their capacities and abilities to protect themselves in
ordinary transactions and business relationships. That many young people under
21 years of age are improvident and reckless is quite evident, but these defects
in judgment are by no means confined to the young. There is another side to the
question. As long as young men and women, under 21 years of age having the
semblance and appearance of adults, are forced to make a living and enter into
business transactions, how are persons dealing with them to be protected if the
infant's word cannot be taken or recognized at law? Are business men to deal
with young people at their peril?
Some states have met the situation by legislation. In Iowa a statute has been
enacted which states that "A minor is bound not only by contracts for necessaries,
but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time
after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money or property
received by him by virtue of the contract, and remaining within his control at
any time after his attaining his majority, except as otherwise provided." Code of
Iowa (1927) § 10493.
"No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minors
own misrepresentations as to the majority or from his having engaged in business
as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe him capable of contract-
ing." Code of Iowa (1927) § 10494.
Also, a Georgia statute provides: "An infant who, by permission of his parent
or guardian, or by permission of the law, practices any profession or trade, or
engages in any business as an adult, he shall be bound for all contracts connected
with such profession, trade or business." Ga. Civ. Code (1910) § 4235. This
statute is discussed in Pearson v. White & Cochran, 13 Ga. App. 117, 78 S. E.
864 (1913) ; Ullmer v. Fitzgerald, 106 Ga. 815, 32 S. E. 869 (1899). See also Kan.
Rev. St. (1923) § 38-103; Comp. Laws of Utah (1917) § 3957; Rem. Comp.
Stat. of Wash. (1922) § 5830.
These statutes and other recent decisions have thus indicated the changing atti-
tude of the public and legislative bodies of the various states toward this question.
It would be well if the other states would follow the example of the states above
mentioned.
As Justice Putman says, "We must remember that the privilege of infancy is
a shield, not a sword, and upon the rescinding of the contract by the infant the
parties should be restored to their original rights." Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H.
250, 59 Am. Dec. 345 (1853).
William F. Donahue.
RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-QUANTUM MERUIT UNDER SPECIAL CoNTRAcTs-In the recent case
of Nesbitt v. Miller, 188 N. E. 702 (Ind. 1934), the very interesting question again
arises as to the recovery for part performance of a personal contract which had
been terminated by death. One B. F. Nesbitt had contemplated growing a peach
orchard on his farm. Consequently he entered into a written contract whereby
he procured the services of W. A. Miller. W. A. Miller was to supervise the grow-
ing of the orchard, and the marketing of the crop. Miller was to be compensated
for his services by receiving one-half the proceeds from the sale of any one crop
which he had the right to select. He was to continue his supervising until the
crop of which he was to receive one-half of the proceeds had been sold. From
January 11, 1917, the date of the execution of the contract, until February 12,
1921, when Miller's death terminated the contract, the deceased had rendered
services to Nesbitt, the defendant, to the best of his ability in pursuance of the
performance of his part of the contract but had received no compensation, the
deceased not having selected the crop from the proceeds of which he was to be
paid. Emily 1. Miller, executrix, of the deceased promisor, W. A. Miller, brought
this action in quasi contract to recover from Nesbitt the value of the services
rendered by deceased under the express contract. The management of the case
seems to indicate that neither the plaintiff's nor the defendant's attorneys thor-
oughly understood the theory of the case. First, the defendant's attorney, labor-
ing under the false interpretation of the theory of the plaintiff's case, contended
that the plaintiff was seeking to recover upon the contract made between the
decedent and the defendant; that the said contract was one of a strictly personal
nature involving particular skill and ability; that it was an entire and indivisible
contract and no right of recovery existed when there was only a partial perform-
ance, even though death, or some other cause beyond the control of the promisor,
and not due to his fault, prevented a complete performance on his part. This
contention had been the grounds of the defendant's demurrer. But his demurrer
had been properly overruled because a sufficient cause of action had been alleged
and the recovery was not sought on the express contract but in a quasi contract
for the value of services rendered to the defendant. The plaintiff in turn seems
to have wandered from her original theory by her evidence on the question of
the quantum of recovery. Instead of proving the value of the services rendered,
evidence was introduced to prove the value of the 1920 peach crop, thus, signify-
ing that the plaintiff thought her quantum of recovery would be the consideration
promised by the defendant in the express contract. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
The Appellate Court of Indiana reversed the judgment of the lower court, order-
ing a new trial, holding that the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover one-
half the proceeds of the sale of the peach crop of 1920 which she would have
been entitled to had the contract been completed; since she was suing on quasi
contract and judgment in the lower court was rendered upon this action, she
should only recover upon proving the value of services rendered by the deceased
to the defendant; and that the plaintiff should recover on the theory of her com-
plaint which was quasi contract or not at all.
Before proceeding further with this discussion let it be emphatically stated
that any recovery that may be obtained in the principal case will be obtained,
not on the express contract, but in quasi contract. Tandy's Assignee v. Hatcher, 9
Ky. Law Rep. 150 (1887); Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 72 (1853); Chamness v. Cox,
2 Ind. App. 485, 28 N. E. 777 (1891); Lee v. Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378, 55 Am. Dec.
110 (1851); Cann v. Rector, Wardens of the Church of the Redeemer, 66 Mo.
App. 500, 85 S. W. 994 (1905) ; Parker v. Macumber, 17 R. I. 674, 16 L. R. A. 858
(1892); Williams v. Butler, 105 N. E. 387 (Ind. 1914).
"A quasi contract is one where liability exists from implication of law arising
from facts and circumstances, independent of agreement or presumed inten-
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tion based on the doctrine of unjust enrichment; the agreement being one
defining the duty of the defendant rather than his intention." 4 Words & Phrases
81; Board v. Highway Com., Bloomington Twp. v. City of Bloomington, 253 IIl.
164, 97 N. E. 280, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 471 (1911).
The early common law rule, which is contra to the doctrine adopted in the
principal case, is that a contract to do a certain thing or to work a certain term
for a certain sum is an entire contract, and unless the thing is completed or the
full term served, no recovery can be had for part performance. This principle
is adopted in the early English case of Cutter v. Powell, 6 T. R. 325, 2 Smith's
Leading Cases 18 (1795), where a sailor, hired for a voyage, had taken a promis-
sory note from his employer for a certain sum provided he proceed, continue and
do his duty on board for the voyage; before the arrival of the ship he died.
Held, no wages could be claimed on the contract or on a quantum meruit. This
principle had also been followed in: Givham v. Dailey, 4 Ala. 336, 21 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 923 (1842), Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52 (1810); Sinclair v. Bowles,
B. & C. 92, 4 M. & R. 1 (1829).
The rigor of this common law rule has been much relaxed in different states
of the union, though in many it is still strictly enforced. The tendency, however,
is observable in recent adjudications to administer an equitable relief to the
parties rather than to hold them to the very letter of their engagements. So it
was decided in the case of Haynes v. Baptist Church, 88 Mo. 285, 57 Am. Rep.
413 (1885), where A. agreed to make and put in place certain church fixtures,
and was to be paid on the completion and acceptance of the work, but before
the completion and acceptance the church burned down, that A. could recover
for as much as he had done up to the time of the fire. Also, see Wilson v. Wagar,
26 Mich. 464 (1873). In these two cases we notice the trend away from the harsh
and unjust common law rule followed by the leading case of Cutter v. Powell,
supra, and other English and American cases cited supra.
The cases under recovery upon quantum meruit can be classified into two
groups: (1) Recovery in quantum meruit where the breach of the contract has
been innocent and without the fault of either party; and (2) Recovery in quantum
meruit where the breach of the contract has been wilful.
Thus, we find modern American decisions tending toward a more lenient
doctrine, as in the case Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553, 20 Am. Rep. 57 (1876).
It was said: "And where the act to be performed is one which the promisor
alone is competent to do, the obligation is discharged if he is prevented by sick-
ness or death from performing it." Accord: Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N. Y. 197, 75
Am. Dec. 388 (1859); Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188, 65 Am. Dec. 531 (1856);
Fuller v. Brown, 11 Met. (Mass.) 440 (1846); Knight v. Bean, 22 Me. 531
(1843); Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463, 69 Am. Dec. 77 (1834); Green v.
Gilbert, 21 Wis. 401 (1867). So that sickness or death is generally regarded as an
act of God in such a sense that it excuses the performance and a recovery is
allowed upon a quantum meruit.
In Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 79, 28 Am. Dec. 618 (1853), it was decided that the
administrator of deceased attorney who in his lifetime agreed to defend a certain
suit for $500, but who died before completing said defense, -may recover for
as much as such services are worth. The action here was upon the quasi contract.
Also, see Persons v. McKibben, 5 Ind. 261, 61 Am. Dec. 85 (1854); Parker v.
Macumber, 17 R. I. 674, 16 L. R. A. 858, 24 Ati. 464 (1892), holding that party
prevented from fully performing contract by an act of God entitled to recover
on implied assumpsit for services rendered. The courts all recognize the injustice
of imposing upon a man, in addition to the calamities of nature, the added mis-
fortunes of a deprivation of the fruits of his toil. Instances where the rule is in-
voked when sickness is the cause of abandonment are found supra.
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Under our second class of cases, wherein there has been a wilful breach and
abandonment of the contract, we find a diversity of opinion. The better view
is to "Let the defaulter suffer."
It is generally held in a great number of our courts that where a person is
employed for a term under an entire contract and abandons and refuses to com-
plete it without legal cause, he can recover nothing for what he has done. This
principle is substantiated by innumerable courts and is the prevailing rule. Lantry
v. Panks, 8 Cow. 63 (1827); Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173, 72 Am. Dec. 442
(1858); Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528 (1837); Thayer v. Wadsworth, 19 Pick.
(Mass.) 349 (1837); Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. (Mass.) 286 (1847); Stark v.
Parker, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 267 (1824); Henson v. Hampton, 32 Mo. 408, (1862);
Kelly & Bragg v. Town of Bratford, 33 Vt. 35 (1860); Patnote v. Sanders, 41 Vt.
66 (1868).
It was held in Riddell v. Peck-Williamson Heating & Ventilating Co., 69 Pac.
241 (Mont. 1902), that where the plaintiff agreed with the defendants, for a
certain sum, to install a heating plant in a building, and the plaintiff abandoned
the work without cause after a part of the plant had been put in, there being
no severance of the contract nor apportionment of the consideration, he could
not recover on a quantum meruit for the value of the work done and materials
furnished. Also, see Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553, 20 Am. Rep. 57 (1876),
where the plaintiff agreed that he and his wife wold work for the defendant
for a year, for a gross sum, and four months afterwards the wife, being about
to give birth to a child, left, and the plaintiff was thereupon discharged, that,
in an action to recover wages on the quantum meruit, the plaintiff should have
foreseen and provided for his wife's sickness when he made the contract, and
that, therefore, his non-performance was not excused and he could not recover.
And in Smith v. Brady, 17 N. Y. 173 (1858), it was held the retention of the
benefit recei ed, is not a waiver of the failure by the other party to perform, for
the very reason that it was a benefit that could not be returned and the keeping
of it would raise no presumption that payment would be made therefor.
But, however, the courts, in their endeavor to discover a rule which would be
applicable to all cases which would do justice to both parties, have made even
a wider departure and hold that although the person contracting to perform an
entire service wilfully abandons it, he may still recover upon a quantum meruit,
less damages not exceeding the amount of the service which the other has suf-
fered in-consequence. Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834);
Lee v. Ashbrook, 14 Mo. 378, 55 Am. Dec. 110 (1851); Purcell v. MaComber,
11 Neb. 209, 7 N. W. 529 (1880); Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99 (1878).
In one of the leading and celebrated cases on this point, Britton v. Turner,
supra, the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant for the term of one year.
The defendant agreed to pay $125 for the year's labor. The plaintiff worked for
nine months and then left the defendant's service without his consent. For the
value of the services for the period while in the defendant's employ, the plaintiff
brought assumpsit for work and labor done. Held, that the laborer, though
voluntarily leaving before his term expired, could recover on quantum meruit.
This decision although adopted in a few states is not followed in the majority
of them. Likewise, under the principle adopted in Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn.
188, 65 Am. Dec. 560 (1856), an employee may recover the reasonable value
of services rendered where he agrees to labor for a certain time, and for a specific
sum, to be paid at the expiration of that time, where he is dismissed by the em-
ployer because of absence occasioned by sickness. The measure of recovery is
the benefit received. This will be determined by the jury, with consideration
given to such circumstances as the manner of the breach of the contract, whether
with or without cause. Coe v. Smith, supra.
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The party contracting for the services may reduce the recovery by showing
the loss that he has incurred on account of the failure fully to perform. Greene
v. Linton, 7 Port. (Ala.) 133, 31 Am. Dec. 707 (1838); Coe v. Smith, supra.
But although the measure of recovery is the benefit received, it is proper to
offer proof of the actual worth of the services as prima facie the benefit to
the party receiving the services would be measured by their worth. Coe v. Smith,
supra.
In Williston on Contracts, § 468 (1), (3), the following principles are stated:
"Except where a contract clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has
rendered part performance for which there is no defined return performance fixed
by contract and who is discharged from the duty of further performance by
impossibility of rendering it, can get judgment for the value of part performance
rendered, unless it can be and is returned to him in specie within reasonable time.
"The value of performance is the benefits derived from the performance in
advancing the object of the contract, not exceeding, however, a ratable portion
of the contract price.
"Since there is no fault on either side, the loss due to impossibility or frustra-
tion must lie where it falls. Neither party can be compelled to pay for the others
disappointed expectations. But on the other hand, neither can be allowed to profit
by the situation. He must pay for what he has received. The amount he must
pay is gauged by the extent that what he has received forwards the object of
the contract.
"If the contract was an unwise one from the standpoint of one who has re-
ceived performance, that does not limit his duty to pay. If on the other hand,
the contract was a disadvantageous one from the standpoint of the one rendering
the performance, he cannot recover for what he has done on a more profitable
basis than the contract affords."
So in conclusion, to adopt the rule laid down in Cutter v. Powell, supra, which
held that the party shall be held to a literal compliance with his special contract
before he can recover anything for labor is too harsh and often, would be unjust.
On the other hand, to follow the rule stated in the case of Britton v. Turner,
supra, that a party may voluntarily abandon his special contract and lose nothing
thereby, would have a tendency to encourage bad faith and lessen the sacredness
of solemn obligations which it is the duty of the court to uphold and enforce so
far as the same can be done without doing manifest injustice.
From consideration of the above cases we obtain the doctrine that seems to
be recognized:
Where under a special contract a party has in good faith bestowed some labor
or parted with some articles to the benefit of another, who has as a matter of fact
enjoyed the benefit of the labor or the articles, whether voluntarily or involun-
tarily, and where the incomplete performance has not been the result of the party's
own provoking or of causes which he might with ordinary diligence have provided
against, the one receiving such benefit must pay therefor. William v. Butler, 58
Ind. App. 47, 105 N. E. 387 (1914); Ball v. Dolan, 21 S. D. 619, 114 N. W. 998
(1908) ; Stolle v. Stuart, 21 S. D. 643, 114 N. W. 1007 (1908) ; Wuchter v. Fitz-
gerald, 83 Or. 672, 163 Pac. 819 (1917); Feldschau v. Clatsop County, 105 Or. 237,
208 Pac. 764 (1922); Schwasnik v. Blandin, 65 Fed. (2d) 354 (1933).
Frank G. Matavovsky.
RECENT DECISIONS
CRIINAL LAw-EvDENCE--HUSBAND AND WI=.-Defendant was indicted for
conspiracy to violate the prohibition laws. He was tried twice and upon both
trials his wife was excluded as a witness on his behalf upon the grounds of in-
competency. The Circuit Court of Appeals sustained this holding. Held, reversing
the decision of the Court of Appeals, that the wife of one on trial in a Fed-
eral court for a criminal offense is not incompetent as a witness on his behalf.
Funk v. United States, 78 L. Ed. 231 (1933).
This decision expressly overrules Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, 55
L. Ed. 102, 31 S. Ct. 193 (1910), and Jim Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S.
189, 65 L. Ed. 214, 41 S. Ct. 98 (1920), which formulated the opposite doctrine.
The point of evidence settled by this case is not to be confused with the privilege
given a husband and wife at common law not to testify against each other.
The instant case deals not with a privilege but with a positive rule of law and
thus the question of waiver is not involved. Wigmore on Evidence § 604, p. 1037.
The common law is not inflexible and immutable but on the contrary is capa-
ble of growth and change to meet varying conditions. Hurtado v. California, 110
U. S. 516, 28 L. Ed. 232, 4 S. Ct. 111 (1883); Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S.
467, 62 L. Ed. 406, 38 S. Ct. 148 (1917); Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325,
36 L. Ed. 991 (1892). Since the reasons for the existence of the rule at common
law are set out in Professor Connor's article on this subject, published elsewhere in
this issue of the Lawyer, it is unnecessary to repeat them here. It is sufficient to say
these reasons have been generally discredited and that legislation in most of the
states and in England has removed the disability entirely. Wigmore on Evidence
§§ 488, 602. The present decision is, therefore, in harmony with the maxim,
"Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex," and with the modern tendency to in-
clude rather than exclude testimony despite the interest of the witness. It re-
sults in the removal from federal jurisprudence of another of those anachronisms
of the law which impede the administration of justice.
Thos. L. McKevitt.
EVDENCE-PREsuMPT ON OF IssuE-WHaRE REiuABrz.-In the case of
United States v. Provident Trust Co., 54 S. Ct. 389 (1934), it was held that
evidence was adrilissible to show that because of an operation a woman could
not he presumed to be able to. bear a child. This would seem to be contra to the
views in the great majority of cases. In this case the woman involved was a
beneficiary of a will which provided that in the event of her death without issue
the residue of the estate would go to certain charities. But under the Internal
Revenue Act of 191$, § 403 (a) (3), 40 Stat. 1057, 1098, if the value of the
remainder devise can be determined at the time of the testator's death it can be
deducted from the estate tax. The charities maintained that because of an opera-
tion, which had taken place before the testator's death, the presumption of the
beneficiary's having issue is rebutted. This granted, the amount of the devise to
the charities could have been estimated at the time of the testator's death by
deducting the beneficiary's life estate from the gross estate. However, the govern-
ment argued that this presumption could not be rebutted. The operation con-
cerned a removal of the beneficiary's uterus, Fallopian tubes and both ovaries,
absolutely precluding any chance of pregnancy. This would be the strongest pos-
sible evidence against the presumption. But the government relies on the view of
Lord Coke (2 Blackstone Commentaries 125) that the presumption was irrebut-
table even though both husband and wife be an hundred years old.
The consensus of opinion seems to be that the English courts have relaxed the
rigidity of this view, while the American courts continue along the strict line of
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interpretation. See note 67 A. L. R. 538, 539, where it is said: "In theory the
fundamental difference between the American and English cases is the tendency
of the American with a few exceptions to treat the presumption of possibility
of issue as absolute, while the English courts have refused to apply a hard and
fast presumption to the question whether the possibility of issue is ever extinct,
but consider it from a practical point of view, and, the common experience of
mankind in the light of circumstances of each particular case."
First, to consider the English view. In Leng v. Hodges, Jacob, 585, 37 Eng.
Rep. 971 (1822), the presumption was overrruled on the basis of age, the woman
being sixty-nine years of age. The same liberality was taken with the presump-
tion in Miles v. Knight, 12 Jur. 656 (1848). The English view has even gone so
far as to hold that women of fifty-six and fifty-one years old (albeit both were
spinsters) were incapable of issue. Lyddon v. Ellison, 19 Beav. 565, 52 Eng. Rep.
470 (1854); Carr v. Carr, 106 L. T. N. S. 733 (1912). There were some views
to the contrary, however, in Groves v. Groves, 9 L. T. N. S. 533 (1864). A
woman forty-nine years of age who had not borne a child for twenty years was
held still capable of producing issue in the eyes of the law. But the most striking
case against the irrebuttability of the presumption was Re Summers, 30 L. T. N.
S. 377 (1874). Here the woman was forty-seven years old and had borne six
children. She had not been pregnant for seventeen years, and on the basis of
medical testimony she was held incapable of further issue.
In America the courts adopt a different view. The presumption is, in the
majority of cases, considered irrebuttable during the life of a woman. In Flora
v. Anderson, 67 Fed. 182 (1895), the testator devised the estate to his daughter
and her issue. But at the time of the making of the will the daughter was fifty
years of age; and when a man attempted to claim as her illegitimate son after
her death it was held that "it was conclusively presumed to be possible to have
issue at any time during her life, and it was not competent to prove that she
was past the age of childbearing when the will was made." Accord: Sims v. Birden,
197 Ala. 690, 73 So. 379 (1916); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N. E.
276 (1922); Futrell v. Futrell, 224 Ky. 814, 7 S. W. (2d) 232 (1928); State v.
Lash, 16 N. J. L. 380, 32 Am. Dec. 397 (1838); White v. Allen, 76 Conn. 185,
56 Atl. 519 (1903); Shuford v. Brady, 169 N. C. 224, 85 S. E. 303 (1915).
However, in Male v. Williams, 48 N. J. Eq. 33, 21 Atl. 854 (1891), evidence
was allowed to show that a woman had undergone her change of life twenty
years before and was incapable of producing. The court said that the presump-
tion that she was past the age of childbearing might have arisen from her age
alone. Likewise in Hill v. Spencer, 196 Ill. 65, 63 N. E. 614 (1902), where the
court said: "The allegation that Martha Hill is past the time of life to bear
children is meaningless as she is presumed in law to be capable of bearing chil-
dren as long as she lives unless more than matter of age is stated in the bil."
Another bit of enlightenment is to be seen in Ansonia Nat. Bank v. Kunkel, 105
Conn. 744, 136 Atl. 588 (1927), where it was held that "the established legal pre-
sumption that a woman of any age may give birth to a child, like other legal
presumptions, has definitely limited uses"; and held that the supposition was not
reasonable that the testator thought a woman sixty-one years of age, childless
and married forty years, might still give birth to a child.
The court in the last case deserves an accolade of praise. It is not the usual
thing for the British courts to lead the American judiciary in laxity of inter-
pretation, but in overruling an absurd presumption such as that stated by Lord
Coke, and followed in America, the English bench deserves commendation. It is
to be hoped that the American courts will follow suit and break their strict ad-
herence to this presumption.
Joseph Kirincich.
RECENT DECISIONS
TORTs-INDEmxT AMONG ToRT-Fmsoas-RE EA.s.-In an action to recover
damages for a personal injury sustained by the plaintiff as the result of the al-
leged malpractice in medical treatment administered to the plaintiff by the de-
fendant, it appeared that the plaintiff had sustained an injury to an ankle in a
fall on a defective sidewalk maintained by one B., against whom she had made
a claim for the damages which she had sustained by reason of his negligence in
maintaining the sidewalk; that the defendant had administered medical treatment
for the injured ankle until the plaintiff was discharged as cured on September 4,
1928; that on April 26, 1929, she settled her claim against B. for $700, and, in
consideration of this payment, she executed a release, which discharged B. from
all liability for harm done or to arise from the injury; and that subsequently she
returned to the defendant for further treatment, receiving injuries as a result
of the defendant's negligence in administering a diathermic heat treatment for
which she brought the present action. The trial court ruled that the release oper-
ated as a release of this claim against the defendant. Upon appeal, this judgment
was reversed. Noll v. Nugent, 252 N. W. 574 (Wis. 1934).
The mistakes of a competent physician or surgeon are among the conse-
quences that may reasonably be expected to result under ordinary circumstances
from the personial injury caused by B's negligence in the principal case. Smith v.
Kansas City Rys. Co., 208 Mo. App. 139, 232 S. W. 261 (1921). But where the
negligence of the surgeon or physician is highly unexpectable, as where he mis-
takes the one injured by defendant for another patient, the defendant is not liable
for the harm due to this negligence. Purchase v. Seelye, 231 Mass. 434, 121 N. E.
413, 8 A. L. R. 503 (1918). Where the negligence of two or more persons com-
bines to produce an injury, the general rule is that such persons are jointly and
severally liable, whether they are acting together, or there is a common design,
or their acts of negligence are separate and independent. Clinger v. Chesapeake
& 0. R. Co., 128 Ky. 736, 109 S. W. 315, 15 L. R. A. (NS) 998 (1908); Cleve-
land, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hilligoss, 171 Ind. 417, 86 N. E. 485, 131 Am. St. Rep.
258 (1908); "Negligence," 45 C. J. 896, 897. While several persons may be guilty
of several distinct negligent acts, yet, if their concurrent effect is to produce an
actionable injury, they are all liable therefor, and the liability is joint and sev-
eral. Clinger v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., supra.
On the other hand, there may be cases where the injured person is entitled
to maintain an action against two or more persons as if they were joint wrong-
doers, without their being, as among themselves, joint wrongdoers. Thus, if A.'s
servant, B., negligently injures C., while B. is engaged in performing A.'s work,
A. and B. are each liable to C.; as between themselves, B. is the wrongdoer and
A. is subjected to liability merely by the doctrine of respondeat superior; so that
if C. sues A. alone and recovers damages for the injury, A., in turn, may compel
B. to indemnify him for the loss. See Clyatt v. Taylor, 71 S. E. 1076, 1078 (Ga.
1911).
In Hooyman v. Reeve, 168 Wis. 420, 170 N. W. 282 (1919), which was an
action for malpractice, the effect of a release given by the injured party to his
employer came up on a demurrer to an answer. It was recited in the answer that
the injured party had executed a release in which he acknowledged "full satisfac-
tion and discharge of all claims, accrued or to accrue, in respect of all injuries
or injurious results, direct or indirect, arising or to arise from an accident sus-
tained" by him while in the employment of his master, the Appleton Coated
Paper Company. The court said: "The malpractice, if any, contributed to produce
the injury settled for and satisfied by the master; hence such cause of action
against the defendant was compensated for and extinguished by the settlement
made. Clearly the settlement covered all damages sustained, including injury
caused by the alleged malpractice. The damages sustained by the acts of the
